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Auditing Pricing, Ownership Concentration and Tunneling Incentive
作 者:
Chao Chen,Song Zhu
关 键 词:
Auditing pricing; Ownership concentration; Tunneling incentive; Auditing opinion; Corporate pyramid
所属领域:
发表年份:
1753年
文献来源:
文献类型:
会议论文
会议论文摘要:
Ownership concentration is prevalent in emerging markets and has a significant influence on the quality of financial information. Does concentrated ownership affect auditing risk? The tunneling incentive of corporate pyramid may also have an affect on auditing risk. It is still uncertain whether the combination of concentrated ownership and the tunneling incentive of pyramid structure affect auditing risk and auditing effort,which in turn affects auditing price. This paper shows that as the control right of ultimate shareholder increases,the probability of receiving unclean auditing opinion will be lower and auditing prices will also decline. The significantly negative relation suggests that concentrated control right in a weak legal system may serve as a signal of confidence and a credible commitment for the management or controlling shareholders. We also find that a higher divergence of cash flow right and control right induces higher incentive for tunneling, therefore the higher probability of unclean audi
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