会议论文摘要：
This study investigates how managerial shareholdings and corporate governance quality impact audit fees in listed companies in Hong Kong. Based on the agency theory, hypotheses are developed on the relationship between managerial shareholdings and audit fees in terms of the separation of ownership and control, and the effect of corporate governance on audit pricing decisions. We examine the relationship between managerial shareholding and audit fees,from the perspectives of both alignment and entrenchment effects. We divide all sample firms into three types of managerial shareholdings, in terms of the level of managerial equity ownership, namely low-, intermediate-, and high levels of managerial ownership, to test the hypotheses. The empirical results reveal that the association of managerial ownership and audit fees is non-linear, i.e. managerial shareholding is significantly and negatively associated with audit fees at low and high levels of managerial ownership, while at the intermediate level, managerial
